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100 N.C. L. REV. 309 (2021)

A Familiar and Recurring Evil: Why Defendants Should Ask Potential
Jurors About Police Brutality*
Despite the constitutional guaranty of trial by a fair and impartial jury, racial
bias has long plagued juries of Black defendants. Although voir dire, the process
of questioning potential jurors during jury selection, could help defendants
identify racially biased jurors, courts have been largely unwilling to hold that
defendants have a right to ask questions about race during voir dire. However,
in State v. Crump, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that Black male
defendants involved in shootings with police do have this right. This Recent
Development explores that holding and examines its future implications,
ultimately arguing that the Crump holding can be used as a powerful tool to
confront racial bias in juries. This Recent Development argues that, especially
in an era where police brutality is well-known and well-documented, questions
about race during voir dire will be most effective when they center on specific
instances of racial bias and police brutality. By engaging in a frank conversation
with potential jurors about their impressions of police interactions with Black
people, attorneys can help secure their clients’ constitutional right to an impartial
jury.
INTRODUCTION
On September 29, 2013, Ramar Crump called his mother to say what he
thought was his final goodbye moments after realizing the men with whom he
had exchanged gunshots were police officers.1 Only fifteen days prior, Jonathan
Ferrell, an unarmed Black man, had been shot and killed by police just thirteen
miles away.2 Although Crump survived his altercation with the police
unharmed, he was convicted by a jury of several charges, including assault with
a deadly weapon with intent to kill.3 Ramar Crump is Black, but despite the
likelihood that Ferrell’s recent death was on Crump’s mind, and despite the
near certainty that many potential jurors were familiar with Ferrell’s death and
other highly publicized encounters between Black men and police, Crump’s
attorney was not permitted to ask a single question about race during voir dire.4
* © 2021 Hannah K. Caison.
1. State v. Crump, 376 N.C. 375, 378, 851 S.E.2d 904, 908 (2020). Crump was ultimately
convicted of several charges, including assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill. Id.
2. Cleve R. Wootson Jr. & Derek Hawkins, The Charlotte Police Shooting that Hasn’t Gone
Away, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2016, 4:11 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/
wp/2016/09/21/the-charlotte-police-shooting-that-hasnt-gone-away/ [https://perma.cc/W5VA-HUKL
(dark archive)].
3. Crump, 376 N.C. at 378–79, 851 S.E.2d at 909.
4. Id. at 388, 851 S.E.2d at 915.
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In State v. Crump,5 the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed
Crump’s convictions, holding that the trial court abused its discretion and
prejudiced Crump when it “categorically denied” his attorney’s attempts to
question potential jurors both generally about their racial biases and specifically
about their impressions of police shootings of Black men.6 In holding that a trial
court cannot prohibit a defendant from asking about race during voir dire where
the subject of race is relevant at trial,7 the Supreme Court of North Carolina
did what the U.S. Supreme Court has largely failed to do in noncapital cases.8
Although Crump is certainly a step toward ensuring Black defendants in North
Carolina are afforded impartial juries, to be most effective Crump must
empower defendants to ask the types of specialized questions that research
shows best help jurors identify their own racial biases. This Recent
Development addresses why such an approach is necessary and argues that,
post-Crump, defense attorneys should ask questions about high-profile instances
of police brutality against Black people to both gauge reactions by jury members
and to prompt those jurors to truly examine their own biases before deciding
the guilt or innocence of Black defendants.
My analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on State v.
Crump. Part II explores the right to an impartial jury and how Crump expands
on that right for North Carolina defendants. Part III argues that race is a
necessary subject for voir dire even though—and perhaps especially because—
many jurors do not view themselves as racist or plagued with racial bias. Finally,
Part IV argues that to best confront racial bias in juries and deliver on the
promise of an impartial jury, it is necessary during voir dire to ask questions
about specific instances of racialized violence that jurors are likely to recognize.
I. BACKGROUND OF STATE V. CRUMP
In the early hours of September 24, 2013, two men gained access to an
underground poker game attended by about a dozen people.9 The men forced
the players to undress, barricaded them in a restroom, and took cash, cell
phones, credit cards, and other personal items from the players.10 In an attempt
to locate the men who had taken items from them, the organizers of the poker
game sent text messages to one of the stolen phones, providing false information
about the time and location of another poker game to lure the person with the

5. 376 N.C. 375, 851 S.E.2d 904 (2020).
6. Id. at 388, 392, 851 S.E.2d at 915, 917–18 (quoting State v. Crump, 259 N.C. App. 144, 155,
815 S.E.2d 415, 423 (2018)).
7. Id. at 384, 388, 851 S.E.2d at 912, 915.
8. See infra notes 50–57 and accompanying text.
9. Crump, 376 N.C. at 376, 851 S.E.2d at 907.
10. Id.
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phone to this bait game.11 On September 29, 2013, three men, one of whom was
Ramar Crump, arrived at the address provided in the text messages for the bait
game.12 When one of the organizers of the bait game saw the three men, he
realized Crump was armed and called the police to report a “suspicious
vehicle . . . occupied by at least two black males [who] appeared [to be] loading
up guns.”13
Four officers were dispatched to the bait game location and were advised
that at least two Black men with loaded guns were intending to commit a
robbery.14 Two of the officers, who were both armed—one with a shotgun—
observed Crump’s car and tried to plan a path through the other cars in the lot
that would allow them to approach the car from the rear.15 However, the route
the officers took actually led them directly to the passenger side of Crump’s
car.16 They did not announce themselves as police officers.17
The accounts of the officers and Crump differ as to who fired the first
shot, but it is undisputed that the officers and Crump exchanged gunshots, after
which the officers sought cover behind another vehicle in the parking lot while
Crump and the other men tried to drive away.18 As Crump tried to drive out of
the parking lot, the officers shot at the car as it passed their hiding spot,
shattering one of the windows and puncturing a tire.19 The officers who had not
exchanged gunshots with Crump began pursuing Crump’s car, activating their
lights and sirens.20 It was only then that Crump and the other men realized they
had exchanged gunshots with police officers.21 Due to this realization, Crump
feared he “might not make it out of this one” alive and called his mother to say
his “final goodbye.”22 The men in Crump’s car attempted to signal their
surrender to the officers pursuing them by putting their hands up outside of the
car windows and by waving a white t-shirt.23 The men even called 911 in an
attempt to surrender with an assurance that they would not be shot by officers.24
The men never pulled over but were eventually stopped when officers
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 376–77, 851 S.E.2d at 907–08.
14. Id. at 377, 851 S.E.2d at 908.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. The officers were, however, in uniform with badges and white patches on their shoulders.
Id. at 390 n.7, 851 S.E.2d at 916 n.7.
18. Id. at 377, 851 S.E.2d at 908.
19. Id. The officers claimed that they believed they were being ambushed by Crump and the men
as Crump was trying to navigate out of the parking lot. Id.
20. Id. at 377–78, 851 S.E.2d at 908.
21. Id. at 378, 851 S.E.2d at 908.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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employed “stop sticks” to blow out the car’s tires.25 Officers searched the car
and found some of the items taken from the September 24th poker game.26
Crump was indicted on a number of charges, including robbery,
kidnapping, and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill.27 A core factual
dispute between the parties was who shot first.28 As a result of this dispute,
Crump’s attorney suspected the State would argue that Crump’s flight from the
scene indicated his guilt on that point.29 Accordingly, Crump’s attorney said he
expected that there would be testimony about Jonathan Ferrell’s death and the
way that Ferrell’s recent shooting at the hands of Charlotte police affected
Crump’s state of mind when Crump was fleeing the police.30 Because of this
expectation, Crump’s attorney attempted to ask potential jurors about their
racial biases and their opinions about police shootings of Black men during voir
dire for Crump’s trial.31 At first, Crump’s attorney tried to ask generally about
implicit bias against Black people, explaining that he was referring to the
“concept that race is so ingrained in our culture that there’s an implicit bias
against people of a particular race, specifically African Americans.”32 Crump’s
attorney asked, “When you hear the statement the only black man charged with
robbery, what’s the first thing that pops into your head?”33 The trial judge
sustained the State’s objection to that line of questioning.34 Crump’s attorney
then tried to ask a more specific question about potential jurors’ impressions
regarding the shooting of Jonathan Ferrell.35 Yet as soon as Crump’s attorney
asked jurors if they were familiar with the Ferrell story, the State objected and
the trial court again sustained the objection.36 In fact, Crump’s attorney asked
if he could ask any questions about potential jurors’ opinions on shootings of
civilians by police officers, and the judge responded that he thought these were
impermissible “stake-out” questions.37 After this exchange, Crump’s attorney
did not attempt to ask any other questions about race or police shootings.38
After Crump was tried and convicted, he appealed, challenging the trial
court’s refusal to allow him to question jurors about racial biases and police

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id., 851 S.E.2d at 908–09.
Id., 851 S.E.2d at 909.
Id. at 377, 851 S.E.2d at 908.
Id. at 390, 851 S.E.2d at 916.
Id.
Id. at 382–83, 851 S.E.2d at 911.
Id. at 382, 851 S.E.2d at 911.
Id.
Id. at 383, 851 S.E.2d at 911.
Id.
Id., 851 S.E.2d at 912.
Id.
Id.
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shootings of Black men.39 The North Carolina Court of Appeals unanimously
affirmed Crump’s conviction, and Crump appealed to the Supreme Court of
North Carolina.40
II. THE RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY AND THE RIGHT TO ASK
POTENTIAL JURORS ABOUT RACIAL BIAS
A.

United States Constitutional Protections

The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides criminal
defendants the right to a trial by an “impartial jury.”41 The Fourteenth
Amendment grants a right to “equal protection of the laws” while providing
that a person is not to be deprived of their life, liberty, or property without “due
process of law.”42 The U.S. Supreme Court has noted the importance of
addressing racial bias as part of securing the grants of those rights, stating that
racial bias in juries is “a familiar and recurring evil that, if left unaddressed,
would risk systemic injury to the administration of justice.”43
Voir dire, the process of questioning potential jurors during jury selection,
is an important part of securing the constitutional guarantee of an impartial
jury.44 Voir dire allows attorneys to both identify potentially biased jurors
whom they would like to strike from the jury45 and engage generally with jurors
in a conversational format, rather than simply presenting evidence at trial. This
allows jurors to explore, through a guided conversation, subjects that are
relevant at trial without also trying to parse through the evidence in a given
case.
While the types of questions usually asked during voir dire vary depending
on the facts of a case, defense attorneys conducting voir dire in criminal cases
seek to identify whether a potential juror (1) harbors bias against their client;
(2) understands the constitutional rights of defendants (like the right against
self-incrimination) and can follow instructions from the judge; and (3) is
sympathetic to the attorney’s story of the case.46 To achieve this second goal, a
defense attorney might ask potential jurors: “The judge has told you that my
client has a right to testify if he wishes and a right not to testify if he so wishes.
39. Id. at 379, 851 S.E.2d at 909.
40. Id. at 380, 851 S.E.2d at 909.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
42. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
43. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017).
44. See Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial
Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1590–91 (2013).
45. See id. at 1590.
46. IRA MICKENBERG, VOIR DIRE AND JURY SELECTION 2–3 (2016), https://www.sog.unc.edu/
sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/course_materials/2016%20Regional%20Training%20for%20Indigent%20
Defense%20Jury%20Selection%20Combined%20Materials.pdf [https://perma.cc/LFJ8-RHSE].
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Can you follow those instructions and not hold it against my client if he chooses
not to testify?”47 To achieve the first and third goals, attorneys might ask a broad
spectrum of questions about a juror’s beliefs, life experiences, and knowledge of
the experiences of those different from them.48 For example, if a defense
attorney’s theory of the case involves the defendant being abused as a child,
during voir dire that attorney would likely want to know if any of the potential
jurors knew anyone who had been abused—or were abused themselves—and
were sympathetic to the effects trauma had on the defendant.49 Any questions
asked during voir dire should be specifically tailored to an individual case and
should seek to identify any jurors who might be biased against the defendant.
While the U.S. Supreme Court has begun to address protections against
racially biased juries,50 the Court has been hesitant to find a constitutional
violation where defendants are not permitted to ask potential jurors about racial
biases during voir dire.51 And although the Court indicated in past cases that
defendants have a right to ask about racial biases during voir dire,52 its
subsequent holdings indicate it has since changed course. In Ristaino v. Ross,53
the Court held that “[t]he Constitution does not always entitle a defendant to
have questions posed during voir dire specifically directed to matters that
conceivably might prejudice veniremen against him.”54 In Ross, the Court
clarified that its earlier holdings simply prescribed that courts consider
“whether under all of the circumstances presented there was a constitutionally
significant likelihood that, absent questioning about racial prejudice, the jurors
would not be as ‘indifferent as (they stand) unsworne.’”55

47. Id. at 3.
48. Id. at 7–8.
49. See id. at 8.
50. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that peremptory challenges based
solely on the race of a potential juror, often used by prosecutors to exclude Black jurors, were
unconstitutional).
51. See Lee, supra note 44, at 1591–92 (explaining that while early cases suggested the Court was
willing to uphold a constitutional right to ask about race during voir dire, it reversed course in
subsequent cases).
52. See Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973) (“[W]e think that the Fourteenth
Amendment required the judge in this case to interrogate the jurors upon the subject of racial
prejudice.”); Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 314–15 (1931) (“We think that it would be . . .
injurious to permit it to be thought that persons entertaining a disqualifying prejudice were allowed to
serve as jurors and that inquiries designed to elicit the fact of disqualification were barred.”).
53. 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
54. Id. at 594.
55. Id. at 596 (quoting 1 EDWARD COKE, FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND; OR, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 155b (19th ed. 1832)). The Court has since
emphasized Ristaino’s holding, stating in a later case that “[a]s Ristaino demonstrates, there is no per se
constitutional rule . . . requiring inquiry as to racial prejudice.” Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451
U.S. 182, 190 (1981).
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The Court recently reaffirmed that “the Constitution at times demands
that defendants be permitted to ask questions about racial bias.”56 But only in
the context of a defendant charged with a capital offense—and even then, only
when the defendant and victim were of different races—has the Court been
willing to find that defendants are entitled to examine racial biases during voir
dire. Specifically, the Court held that “a capital defendant accused of an
interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors . . . questioned on the
issue of racial bias.”57 These holdings mean that while defendants can challenge
the exclusion of jurors based on race, they are very limited in their ability to ask
questions during voir dire that would limit the inclusion of racially biased jurors.
B.

North Carolina Constitutional Protections

The Supreme Court of North Carolina has found similar protections
under Article I of the North Carolina Constitution,58 holding that the state’s
constitution protects against the “corruption of [North Carolina’s] juries by
racism, sexism and similar forms of irrational prejudice.”59 Before Crump, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina recognized the U.S. Supreme Court’s
holdings on the right to ask about race during voir dire in some contexts, but it
also emphasized the discretion of the trial court as to the form and number of
questions on race.60 In Crump, the Supreme Court of North Carolina again
referenced the discretion of the trial court to prescribe the “extent and manner”
of questions during voir dire.61 However, the court in Crump recognized a limit
to that discretion, holding that despite its broad discretion, the trial court cannot
altogether prohibit questioning on a “relevant topic.”62
In Crump, the Supreme Court of North Carolina found that “the trial court
flatly prohibited questions about racial bias and categorically denied [the]
defendant the opportunity to ask prospective jurors about police-officer
shootings of black men,” and held that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying Crump the opportunity to ask about racial bias.63 In reaching this
56. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868 (2017).
57. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36–37 (1986).
58. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24 (providing the right to a jury trial in criminal cases).
59. State v. Cofield, 320 N.C. 297, 302, 357 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1987). In Cofield, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina held that North Carolina’s Constitution extends further than simply
protecting against exclusion of jurors, holding that even the perception that North Carolina’s juries are
marred by prejudice is a violation. See id.
60. State v. Gray, 322 N.C. 457, 460, 368 S.E.2d 627, 629 (1988). Interestingly, in Gray, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina cited Turner v. Murray as a case that held that a “defendant has the
right to have the jurors interrogated on the issue of racial bias,” without clarifying that the Turner Court
cabined its holding to capital cases. See id. However, Gray has not been cited as providing a more
expansive right than the one the U.S. Supreme Court granted.
61. State v. Crump, 376 N.C. 375, 382, 851 S.E.2d 904, 911 (2020).
62. Id. at 388–89, 851 S.E.2d at 915.
63. Id. at 389, 851 S.E.2d at 915.
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holding, the court found that the questions about Ferrell and police shootings
were relevant and that the inability to ask such relevant questions prejudiced
Crump.64 In finding the questions relevant, the court emphasized that the
“connection between the question about the Ferrell case and the topic of racial
bias was readily apparent” and, therefore, an appropriate and relevant topic for
voir dire.65
To support this finding of relevancy, the court underscored both the
officers’ knowledge that Crump and the others in the car were Black men and
the (correct) assumption by Crump’s attorney that the State would use Crump’s
flight as evidence of guilt rather than consider that action in light of Black men’s
experiences with the police.66 The relevancy holding is twofold: The court
indicated that (1) general questioning about racial animus against Black people
was relevant because a racially biased juror might improperly credit law
enforcement testimony over Crump’s version of events,67 and (2) specific
questions about police shootings of Black men were relevant because of the way
that those incidents impacted Crump’s state of mind when he realized he was
fleeing from the police.68
After holding that these questions were relevant, the court found that the
trial court prejudiced Crump when it denied him the opportunity to ask the
questions. The court explained how the “inability to question prospective jurors
about racial bias and police-officer shootings of black men deprived [Crump] of
a crucial tool needed to mitigate the risk that his trial would be infected by racial
prejudice.”69 Notably, for North Carolina defendants, this holding establishes
another instance that “demands that defendants be permitted to ask questions
about race,”: cases “involving a black male defendant involved in a shooting
with police officers.”70
III. CONFRONTING WHITE JUROR BIAS
Post-Crump, Black defendants in North Carolina whose cases involve a
shooting with police officers must be allowed to ask questions about race during
voir dire. But should they ask? One scholar, Professor Sarah Forman, cautioned
against asking jurors about race, indicating that jurors might feel attacked or
uncomfortable.71 Forman advised against attorneys attempting to expose jurors’
hidden racial bias, cautioning that simply revealing that implicit bias existed in
64. Id. at 392, 851 S.E.2d at 917–18.
65. Id. at 385, 388, 851 S.E.2d at 913, 914.
66. Id. at 390–91, 851 S.E.2d at 916–17.
67. Id. at 390, 851 S.E.2d at 916.
68. Id. at 390–91, 851 S.E.2d at 916–17.
69. Id. at 392, 851 S.E.2d at 917.
70. Id. at 388, 851 S.E.2d at 915.
71. Sarah Jane Forman, The #Ferguson Effect: Opening the Pandora’s Box of Implicit Racial Bias in
Jury Selection, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 171, 176 (2015).
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a jury would not mitigate it.72 However, despite these understandable worries
about alienating jurors, other studies have shown not only the pervasiveness of
racial biases in juries, but also how voir dire can help combat these biases.
Although research in this area is not conclusive, there are indications that
white jurors harbor racial biases against Black defendants, and that these biases
affect their opinion on defendants’ guilt or innocence. One empirical study
found that juries formed out of jury pools consisting solely of white people
convict Black defendants more often than white defendants.73 That study also
found that the presence of at least one Black person in the jury pool eliminated
the conviction disparity between white and Black defendants.74 Other studies
using mock jurors found that white mock jurors who watched video summaries
of rape trials were more likely to believe that the defendant in the trial was
guilty when the version of the summary they watched depicted a Black
defendant.75 White jurors may also be more likely to ignore incriminating
evidence at trial when a defendant is white, but are not willing to do so when a
defendant is Black—even if the evidence is ruled inadmissible.76
Of course, Forman was not arguing that racial bias is nonexistent in juries,
but rather that acknowledging that fact during voir dire might do more harm
than good. Forman feared that jurors would think a defendant was “playing the
race card” by highlighting racial issues in a case.77 However, highlighting and
making race salient in a case, especially where racial issues may not be
immediately obvious to jury members, may actually have the opposite effect.
When jurors are reminded of racial issues in a case—or when a trial is racially
charged and the racial issues inherent in a case are obvious—white jurors tend
to correct for implicit biases.78 Another mock-juror study presented white jurors
with different versions of facts in a case involving a fight between basketball
teammates in a high school locker room.79 When researchers presented jurors
with the version of the facts that indicated the fight was motivated by racial
animus toward the defendant, jurors were no more likely to convict the Black
defendant than the white defendant.80 However, when jurors were not alerted
to the presence of racial animus as a factor in the fight, they were more likely
to convict the Black defendant than the white defendant.81
72. Id. at 175–76.
73. Peter A. Joy, Race Matters in Jury Selection, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 180, 182 (2015).
74. Id.
75. Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race and
Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1006 (2003).
76. Id. at 1006–07.
77. Forman, supra note 71, at 176.
78. Sommers & Ellsworth, supra note 75, at 1013.
79. Id. at 1016.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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This benefit of race salience has also appeared in studies using questioning
during voir dire to emphasize race. In one such study, mock jurors were asked
one of two versions of questions during voir dire.82 One version, the “raceneutral” version, asked jurors about their experience with the criminal justice
system, including whether they had ever been the victim of a crime or testified
at trial.83 The other version, the “race-relevant” version, alerted jurors that the
trial “involve[d] an African American defendant and white victim” and asked
how this might affect their reactions to the trial.84 The “race-relevant” questions
also asked if jurors harbored any bias that might prevent them from treating a
Black defendant fairly and whether they thought a defendant’s race impacted
their treatment by police and the legal system as a whole.85
After being questioned, researchers split jurors into two groups (juries
composed solely of white jurors and juries composed of both white and Black
jurors) and instructed them to watch a summary of a trial involving a Black
defendant charged with sexual assault and asked each juror individually whether
they would vote guilty or not guilty.86 All mock jurors (white jurors in all-white
groups, white jurors in diverse groups, and Black jurors in diverse groups) were
less likely to vote to convict after receiving race-relevant voir dire than their
counterparts who had received race-neutral voir dire.87
The results referenced in the above studies can be attributed to the idea
that as a whole, Americans find explicit prejudices and racism unacceptable and
embrace the idea that we are an egalitarian society.88 However, despite this
belief, many Americans—and many white Americans in particular—harbor
implicit biases against Black people that often go unchecked.89 When race is not
made salient, many white jurors will fail to examine whether their conclusions
are the result of racial biases. However, when race is made an explicit issue in a
case, these same jurors will likely remember the egalitarian ideals they hold and
attempt to fulfill them.90 By reminding white jurors of racial biases, and by
engaging potential jurors in a discussion about race, lawyers can remind white
jurors that racism is pervasive and ensure that jurors recognize and correct for
their personal biases.91
82. Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects
of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 597, 602 (2006).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 603.
88. Lee, supra note 44, at 1570.
89. Id. at 1570–71; see also Brian A. Nosek, Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald,
Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Web Site, 6 GRP. DYNAMICS 101, 105
(2002).
90. Lee, supra note 44, at 1587.
91. Id.
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Forman worried that asking about racial bias would not allow for the
revelation of racist jury members.92 Even assuming this is true, the referenced
studies reveal that the benefit of asking about race during voir dire may not be
in identifying which jurors to exclude from the jury, but instead in alerting the
jury as a whole to racial issues underlying a case. The phenomenon of race
salience at trial indicates that even if Ramar Crump’s jury makeup had not
changed as a result of questioning about race, the mere fact that a discussion
was had about race during voir dire could have affected the outcome. The court
in Crump hinted at this by noting that they do not “impugn the integrity of the
jurors who ultimately decided to convict,” but that its ruling was instead based
on the fact that Crump was deprived of “a crucial tool needed to mitigate the
risk that his trial would be infected by racial prejudice.”93 Rather than thinking
of questions about race during voir dire as a way to strike racist jurors, lawyers
should consider questions about race as a mitigation technique and ask them in
an attempt to alert the jury as a whole to racial biases.
IV. ASKING ABOUT HIGH-PROFILE POLICE BRUTALITY INSTANCES
DURING VOIR DIRE
Given the conclusion that defendants should ask about race when they
have the right to ask about race, how should they frame questions? Crump
established a right for Black male defendants in North Carolina to ask about
race when their case involves a shooting with police officers, but it left the form
of those questions to the discretion of the trial court.94 However, the court did
hint at what types of questions might be preferable when it stated that the initial
questions asked by Crump’s attorney about general implicit bias were
“somewhat confusingly phrased” but that putting the question of racial bias in
the context of the Ferrell case “clarif[ied]” the inquiry.95 Despite this indication
that defendants should frame their questions around concrete sets of facts or
instances, some attorneys may still prefer to ask generalized questions like “do
you harbor racial bias?” However, vague questions are unlikely to be as
advantageous for defendants as more specific questions about events jurors are
likely familiar with.

92. See Forman, supra note 71, at 177. Forman feels that the time afforded to voir dire is
insufficient to parse the racial biases of every potential juror and might ultimately anger jurors who felt
they were accused of being racist. See id. at 175–76.
93. State v. Crump, 376 N.C. 375, 391–92, 851 S.E.2d 904, 917 (2020).
94. Id. at 388, 851 S.E.2d at 915. Although Crump cabined its holding to shootings between Black
men and police officers, these types of questions would be helpful for any attorney arguing that racial
bias impacted an interaction between their client and the police. Attorneys in those cases should still
cite Crump and argue that its holding should be extended.
95. Id. at 389, 851 S.E.2d at 915.
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Aversive Racism and the Problem with Asking “Are You Racist?”

As exhibited by the phenomenon of race salience at trial, jurors are
unlikely to think of themselves as racist and will try to correct for individual
biases when race is made salient.96 However, despite people’s hope that they do
not exhibit racial biases, results from Harvard’s Implicit Association Test show
that even people who self-report as not holding racist beliefs or racial biases are
more likely to associate negative words with names they associate with Black
people rather than names they associate with white people.97 In other words,
many people—non-Black people in particular—harbor implicit biases against
Black people.98
This disparity between self-reported lack of biases and implicit prejudice
is known as “aversive racism” because although people are averse to explicit
racism and to thinking of themselves as racist, they nonetheless exhibit
prejudice.99 This aversion to admitting one’s own prejudices means people are
unlikely to answer affirmatively to questions that ask whether they harbor biases
or racist beliefs.100 In fact, although not race-specific, studies have shown that
jurors do lie or withhold information during voir dire and that one motivation
for this is an unwillingness to admit something they see as embarrassing.101
Jurors who exhibit aversive racism would likely be embarrassed to identify
themselves as racist in front of their peers, so questions such as “are you racist?”
or “do you harbor racial prejudices?” are likely to be ineffective in getting jurors
to self-identify as racist or to identify the racial issues in a given case.
The North Carolina Office of Indigent Defense Services seems to have
recognized the problems arising from asking potential jurors if they are racist—
the Office’s training manual on voir dire and jury selection explicitly cautions
against such questions.102 Instead, that manual recommends attorneys ask about
specific instances a juror has experienced that involved racial bias. The manual
suggests that a better prompt for potential jurors is “tell us about the most
serious incident you ever saw where someone was treated badly because of their
96. See supra notes 77–91 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 44, at 1571–72.
98. Id. at 1572. Even Black Americans exhibit some bias against Black people, although this
percentage is lower than for other groups. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Sommers, supra note 82, at 601.
101. See generally Richard Seltzer, Mark A. Venuti & Grace M. Lopes, Juror Honesty During the Voir
Dire, 19 J. CRIM. JUST. 451, 460 (1991) (concluding that the authors’ study supports previous studies
showing that jurors lie during voir dire for a myriad of reasons).
102. MICKENBERG, supra note 46, at 7. Other questions suggested by that training manual include:
“Tell us about the worst experience you or someone close to you ever had because someone stereotyped
you because of your []race . . .”; “[t]ell us about the most significant interaction you have ever had with
a person of a different race”; and “[t]ell us about the most difficult situation where you, or someone
you know, stereotyped someone, or jumped to a conclusion about them because of their []race . . . and
turned out to be wrong.” Id. at 11.
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race.”103 Similarly, although researchers in the above-referenced study (finding
that race-relevant voir dire affected the likelihood that a juror would vote to
convict) did in fact ask general questions about whether mock jurors harbored
racial biases, they also asked more specific questions on how race affects the
treatment of defendants in the legal system.104
B.

Potential Benefits of Asking About Police Brutality as a Way To Contextualize
Racial Bias

While the suggested questions in the North Carolina Office of Indigent
Defense Services training and those used by the voir dire study are certainly
more specific than the initial questions asked by Crump’s attorney about
implicit bias, they still fail to ascertain jurors’ specific attitudes about police
shootings and Black men. In order to best make race salient in a particular case,
attorneys should try to identify analogous instances to the fact situation at hand.
In future cases where attorneys hope to use Crump’s holding to secure the right
to ask about race during voir dire, they need look no further for an example of
analogous instances than the second line of questioning attempted by Crump’s
attorney.
Crump’s attorney tried to ask jurors if they were familiar with the shooting
of Jonathan Ferrell,105 an unarmed Black man who was shot and killed by
Charlotte police fifteen days before Ramar Crump was arrested.106 In the early
morning hours of September 14, 2013, Ferrell was involved in a car crash and
knocked on the door of a nearby home to seek help.107 The resident of the home
called 911 and told police officers that a Black man was breaking in her front
door, and three police officers were dispatched to her home.108 When the police
officers arrived, Ferrell started to walk toward their car and was shot at with a
taser; after this Ferrell tried to run away into the darkness but ended up running
toward another officer, who fired twelve shots at Ferrell.109 Ten shots hit
Ferrell, and he died at the scene.110 Protests erupted throughout the city of
Charlotte when a deadlocked jury failed to convict the officer who killed
Ferrell.111
At Crump’s trial, a core factual dispute was who (Crump or police) fired
the first shot, meaning jurors would have to decide whether to credit the

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 7.
See supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text.
State v. Crump, 376 N.C. 375, 383, 851 S.E.2d 904, 911–12 (2020).
Wootson & Hawkins, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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testimony of Crump or that of the officers.112 Crump’s attorney said that he
wanted to ask about the Ferrell case because he assumed the State would argue
that Crump’s failure to pull over when being pursued was indicative of his
guilt.113 Crump’s attorney wanted to gauge whether potential jurors were aware
of Ferrell’s shooting because he intended to argue that that incident, as well as
similar incidents of Black men being shot by police, went to Crump’s state of
mind when fleeing.114 Crump’s attorney was correct in his assumption about the
State’s argument; at trial, counsel for the prosecution argued that Crump’s
“refusal to immediately surrender to law enforcement officers was motivated
not by a fear that he would not survive his interaction with the police, but
instead by a desire to escape apprehension.”115
Had the jury had a conversation during voir dire about the Ferrell case, it
seems likely that issues of race would have been made salient in this case. A jury
that had engaged in conversation about Ferrell’s death would have been more
prepared to understand Crump’s actions—his failure to pull over, putting his
hands up outside of his car window, his 911 call to attempt to arrange a safe
surrender—within the context of Black men’s experiences with the police.
Perhaps this line of questioning would have revealed—and allowed Crump to
strike—a potential juror who harbored racial animus and who would
automatically credit testimony of police over that of a Black man. However,
even if this line of questioning did not change the makeup of the jury, it would
have presented an important tool for Crump to make race salient and mitigate
implicit biases in his case.
Crump’s attorney is not the only attorney who has recognized the
potential need to engage with jurors about police shootings of Black men during
voir dire. One public defender, Patrick Brayer, recounted his experience
conducting voir dire nine days after and ten miles away from where Michael
Brown was shot and killed by police in Ferguson, Missouri.116 Brayer recognized
that regardless of whether or not he brought up Michael Brown, jurors all
harbored their own views on law enforcement and race and that these views
could affect their deliberation.117 Yet despite feeling as though he should have
discussed Michael Brown with jurors, Brayer ultimately chose not to due to his
worries that the subject would be too controversial and would create resentment
toward his client.118 In reflecting on that experience, Brayer realized that his
failure to bring up Brown’s death did not keep the jurors from letting their own
112. State v. Crump, 376 N.C. 375, 390, 851 S.E.2d 904, 915 (2020).
113. Id.
114. Id., 851 S.E.2d at 916–17.
115. Id. at 391, 851 S.E.2d at 915–16.
116. Patrick C. Brayer, Hidden Racial Bias: Why We Need To Talk with Jurors About Ferguson, 109
NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 163, 163 (2015).
117. See id. at 164.
118. Id.
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biases impact their judgments. Instead, it ensured that they would form a “racial
identity status” to interpret the events of the case based solely on their own
experiences, and that this identity model would likely lack the depth that a
model formed through conversations with other jurors with different
experiences would.119
Brayer’s reflections lie at the heart of the concept of race salience and strike
at why aversive racism is so insidious: failing to discuss race and policing with
jurors does not mean they will be unaffected by racial bias. Instead, it means
jurors are left totally to themselves to form conclusions about how race affected
a particular case rather than having the opportunity to engage with their fellow
jurors, confront—and often correct for—their own biases, and move forward as
more fair judges of the issues in a case.
Of course, a trial or the events that gave rise to a trial need not happen in
such close proximity to a high-profile police shooting of a Black person in order
to justify the discussion of police shootings during voir dire. Many jurors are
likely to be familiar with police shootings or other police killings of Black
people. Jurors in close proximity to Ferguson are not the only jurors familiar
with the killing of Michael Brown—thousands of people across the United
States took to the streets to protest his killing at the hands of police and the
subsequent failure to indict the police officer who killed him.120 In the summer
of 2020, the death of George Floyd at the hands of police led millions of people
in the United States to participate in Black Lives Matter protests.121 With the
widespread movement to bring attention to police brutality, it would be nearly
impossible for a potential juror to not be familiar with stories like Jonathan
Ferrell’s, Michael Brown’s, or George Floyd’s.
The prevalence of stories of police brutality in the United States means
that rather than attorneys framing their questioning of potential jurors around
instances in their own lives where they observed racial bias, attorneys can
instead point to examples of police killings of Black people that jurors are likely
already familiar with. These events both provide context for jurors to talk about
race and are likely more analogous to a fact situation that, in North Carolina
post-Crump, gives rise to the right to ask about race during voir dire than are
events that a juror may have personally observed. Additionally, as Brayer
pointed out, the prevalence of these stories in the national consciousness means
119. Id. at 165–66.
120. Ferguson Grand Jury Decision Sparks Protests Nationwide, CBS NEWS (Nov. 24, 2014,
11:54 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ferguson-grand-jury-decision-sparks-protests-nationwide
[https://perma.cc/RM69-WSEZ].
121. Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest
Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/
07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/8HDW-PAXE (dark archive)]
(estimating that between fifteen and twenty-six million people participated in Black Lives Matter
protests in the United States during summer of 2020).
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that jurors are already likely to know about them and have opinions surrounding
these events; bringing these instances out into the open during voir dire
provides the best chance for defendants to mitigate racial bias that might
otherwise go unaddressed.
Once attorneys adopt the practice of bringing up police brutality and
questioning about racial bias during voir dire, they will still be left to sort
through what to do with the answers they receive. Some answers might reveal
that a potential juror is unable to be impartial and should be struck from the
jury—for instance, an attorney should likely strike a juror who denied the
existence of systemic racism or who revealed that they were always inclined to
side with police in police brutality cases regardless of the underlying facts.
However, even if no juror expresses a view that makes an attorney question
their impartiality, these questions are still valuable because of the
aforementioned mitigating factors of race salience.
C.

Trial Court Discretion and Police Brutality Questions

Black male defendants in North Carolina whose cases involve a shooting
with police who want to ask about police killings of Black people during voir
dire can rely on Crump’s holding to ensure they are allowed to bring up race
during voir dire. However, as Crump emphasized, the trial court has broad
discretion over the “extent and manner” of questions.122 For example, the trial
court can forbid “stake-out” questions—questions that attempt to ascertain what
a juror’s decision would be under a specific set of facts.123 Despite the Crump
majority’s suggestion that the questions specifically about Ferrell were
preferable to more general inquiries about racial bias so as to avoid stake-out
hypotheticals,124 some trial court judges might still be unwilling to allow
inquiries into a potential juror’s thoughts and opinions surrounding highly
publicized instances of police brutality.
To avoid accusations of using stake-out questions, attorneys can carefully
frame questions as aiming to invoke conversations about race rather than asking
jurors how they would have voted in similar cases. Additionally, attorneys
should invoke not only the right to ask about race in cases involving a Black
male defendant and the police, but also should adhere to the Crump majority’s
seeming preference for specific, rather than general, inquiries into racial issues.
Admittedly, some judges might still cabin questioning to the less helpful—
although not entirely useless, as talking about race at all can help make race
salient—types of questions about race generally. But when allowed, attorneys

122. State v. Crump, 376 N.C. 375, 382, 851 S.E.2d 904, 911 (2020).
123. Id.
124. See supra notes 63–68 and accompanying text.
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should frame questions around specific factual instances of police brutality
against Black people.
CONCLUSION
Racial bias in juries has been described as a “familiar and recurring evil,”
but the U.S. Supreme Court has largely failed to provide defendants the right
to ask about race during voir dire despite the fact that this would be an
important way to mitigate racial bias. In State v. Crump, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina identified a fact situation in which defendants have the right to
ask about race, providing Black men whose cases involve shootings with the
police a basis for voir dire questions about race. Post-Crump, defendants and
their attorneys should be empowered not only to ask about race and make issues
of race salient in a case during voir dire, but to frame their questions around
specific factual circumstances. As jurors are already likely to be familiar with
instances of police brutality across the nation, and as they will likely have
formed opinions about those instances that will affect their opinions about a
case, attorneys should make an affirmative effort to have open discussions about
police brutality during voir dire. Perhaps a few people who harbor extreme
racial animus will be struck from juries; but more importantly, all jury members
will move forward as a group that has engaged with their own complicated
feelings surrounding race and policing. By encouraging jurors to openly engage
in these discussions, defense attorneys can hope to make the evil of racial bias
in juries less familiar and less recurring.
HANNAH K. CAISON**

** I am forever grateful to the many people who have helped me on the road to this piece’s
publication. To the entire board and staff of the North Carolina Law Review, thank you for your
countless hours editing and cite checking this piece. To my primary editor, Bonnie Ballard, a special
thanks for your time, dedication, and helpful suggestions; this piece would truly not be the same
without you. To my partner, Andy, thank you for your unwavering love and support in law school and
in life.

100 N.C. L. REV. 309 (2021)

326

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

